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I. JURISDICTION 
Although the Industrial Commission of Utah was not listed 
as a party defendant, this is an action for review and determination 
of the lawfullness of an award made by the Commission. In addition 
the cover page of plaintiff refers to Administrative Law Judge for 
this matter as being Timothy C. Allen, whereas, in fact, the Chief 
Administrative Law Judge, Richard G. Sumsion was the Administrative 
Law Judge whose Findings and Order were affirmed by the full 
Commission in the Order Denying Motion for Review sought to be 
overturned in this action. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction by 
virtue of Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-83. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
It is the defendant's position that the sole issue 
presented for determination in this case is as follows: whether 
there is any evidence to support the Finding by the Commission of a 
July 25, 1985 commencement date for plaintiff's permanent total 
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disability benefits. 
III. DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Statutes believed to be determinative of the issue raised 
in this case are Sections 35-1-69, 35-1-83. and Section 35-1-84, 
Utah Code Annotated. Cases and authority believed by defendant to 
be determinative of this controversy include Oman v. Industrial 
Commission, 55 Utah Adv. Rep. 59 (Ct. app. 4/15/87); Booms v. Rapp 
Constr. Co., 720 P. 2d 1363 (Utah 1986); Kerans v. Industrial 
Commission, 713 P. 2d 49 (Utah 1985); Spencer v. Industrial 
Commission, 87 Utah 336, 40 P. 2d 188 (1935). 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 6. 1975 plaintiff was injured when he slipped 
and fell while carrying two 100 lbs. sacks of mud. The injury 
resulted in pain in the neck and chest which persisted through 
medication and conservative measures and eventually resulted in 
cervical disc surgery in November, 1976 and a rib resection surgery 
in August, 1977. Plaintiff still did not improve significantly and 
was referred to a neurosurgeon who raised a number of questions and 
made some strong re-evaluation recommendations which he indicated 
might to lead to further specific treatment. Dr. Powell concluded 
in his report of June 23, 1978 by saying that while plaintiff was at 
present still totally disabled he "would not consider him to have 
reached a point of maximal improvement". 
Plaintiff applied for compensation benefits and his case 
was heard by Administrative Law Judge, Keith E. Sohm (who now 
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represents plaintiff in these proceedings) who referred plaintiff to 
a Medical Panel for examination. evaluation and resolution of 
medical questions. The Panel in its report of March 5, 1979 found 
that plaintiff was 67% disabled (this rating was questioned by a 
Supplemental Medical Panel Report dated November 7, 1986 by Dr. 
Nathaniel M. Nord who opined that plaintiff's permanent partial 
impairment appeared "more likely in the range of 20-30%".) In 
addition to its 67% impairment rating the first Medical Panel 
expressed the necessity for further testing and exploration to 
determine whether or not there might be additional surgery and/or 
other treatment which might be of benefit and ease some of 
plaintiff's pain symptoms. Judge Sohm adopted the Medical Panel 
Report and issued Findings of Fact. Conclusion of Law and Order in 
which plaintiff was awarded 67% permanent partial disability 
benefits with a further review of the issue of permanent total 
disability determination being reserved until such time as the above 
mentioned permanent partial disability award had expired. 
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Review claiming that he was, 
in fact, permanent and totally disabled. On July 18, 1979 the 
Commission entered its Denial for Motion for Review essentially 
affirming the Order entered by Judge Sohm but specifically 
indicating that the issue of permanent and total disability would 
not be closed until the ALJ order of benefits had run its course. 
The Commission further specifically stated that it would "defer 
further consideration of this case to at least March 1, 1981. After 
the date aforementioned, the applicant may again file with the 
Commission for a determination of permanent partial or permanent 
-3-
total benefits." 
After the denial of the Motion for Review was entered Judge 
Sohm, in response to a letter from counsel for plaintiff, 
specifically advised that, "when the applicant's benefits run out 
after 187.2 weeks the applicant may make application for additional 
benefits from the Special Fund and that application will be 
considered at that time." Thereafter, plaintiff filed an appeal 
with the Utah Supreme Court; defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss 
the Writ of Review on the grounds that the Order of the Commission 
was not a final Order and therefore not subject to appeal. The 
Motion to Dismiss was granted. 
No further action was taken by plaintiff with respect to 
his claim for permanent total disability until March 20, 1985 when 
he wrote to the Commission seeking clarification of his rights. 
Judge Sohm responded to his inquiry by letter dated April 1, 1985 
advising the plaintiff to provide medical reports from his treating 
physican and the physician's opinion whether or not plaintiff at 
that time was able to work or whether his condition had worsened. 
Judge Sohm retired as an Administrative Law Judge in May of 1985 and 
on June 28, 1985 he filed on behalf of plaintiff the Application for 
Hearing and for an award of permanent total disability benefits. On 
August 7, 1985 the Commission received a medical report from Dr. 
Ross McNaught who had examined plaintiff on July 25 of that year. 
The report indicated that in certain aspects plaintiff's 
neurological picture was deteriorating and had been particularly so 
over the last couple of months. There was no indication in that 
report, however, as to whether or not the deteriorated condition was 
-4-
caused by or related to the 1975 industrial accident. 
Upon receipt of the above. Richard G. Sumsion, the 
Administrative Law Judge assigned to handle the new application, 
conferred with the defendant employer/carrier and the Administrator 
of the Second Injury Fund which for the first time had been made a 
party to this controversy. The Administrator of the Fund after 
reviewing the medical record and the file agreed to place plaintiff 
on its permanent total payroll without the necessity of a referral 
to rehabilitation services. The Administrator of the Fund, however, 
specifically reserved for determination by the Administrative Law 
Judge the date upon which the applicant became permanently and 
totally disabled so as to entitle him to benefits from the Second 
Injury Fund, the accrued amounts due, if any, the interest due, if 
any, and the medical expenses yet unpaid for which the Second Injury 
Fund may have had some liability. Since the defendant/carrier had 
already paid out any possible maximum liability with respect to 
plaintiff's permanent total disability claim, Judge Sumsion who was 
assigned to the matter in place of retired Judge Sohm issued an 
Award placing plaintiff on the permanent total disability payroll of 
the Second Injury Fund as of July 25, 1985 which was the date 
plaintiff had been examined for the report submitted on August 7, 
1985 by Dr. Ross McNaught. By agreement of the parties, plaintiff 
was referred to Dr. Nathaniel M. Nord for re-evaluation and 
determination of the remaining medical issues with respect to this 
controversy. Dr. Nord examined plaintiff and noted that although no 
new symptoms had developed previously reported symptoms had 
intensified. As noted above, Dr. Nord opined that plaintiff's 
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permanent physical impairment was between 20 and 30% rather than the 
67% set out by the 1979 examining Medical Panel. He further 
reported that, "there is no significant change in Mr. Heaton's 
permanent physical impairment. Symptoms of dysfunction are reported 
to be increased, while objective changes in physical examination 
cannot be appreciated." In response to questions posed by the ALJ, 
Dr. Nord rendered the following: 
The applicant was not rendered unemployable as of 
October 1, 1981, or subsequent thereto, on the basis of 
physical impairment. However, intensified symptoms, the 
patient's perceptions of disability and attitudes regarding 
return to work likely rendered him unemployable: (Emphasis 
Added) 
As a result of the Supplemental Panel report submitted by Dr. 
Nord, Judge Sumsion on February 2, 1987 issued Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order in which he adopted the Medical Panel 
report of Dr. Nord with respect to the allocation and amount of 
permanent impairment as well as Dr. Nord's reference to plaintiff's 
"intensified symptoms" with respect to plaintiff's "perceptions of 
disability and attitudes regarding return to work" along with Dr. 
Nord's opinion that plaintiff was not rendered unemployable as of 
October 1. 1981 or subsequent thereto on the basis of physical 
impairment. Judge Sumsion also referred in particular to the 
medical report dated July 7, 1985 from Dr. Ross McNaught in which 
reference was made to recent deterioration of plaintiff's neurologic 
condition which in Judge Sumsion1s opinion in consideration of all 
the evidence was considered to "provide evidence of a deteriorating 
condition" sufficient to support a Permanent Total Disability Award 
as of that date. The Order of Judge Sumsion also points out that 
plaintiff himself alleged a worsening of condition in the attachment 
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which he filed with his Application for Hearing on June 28, 1985. 
Judge Sumsion took care to point out that there had been no 
determination in any of the prior Findings or Orders issued which 
held that plaintiff was in fact permanently and totally disabled as 
of 1978, 1979, 1981, or any other date prior to the submission of 
Dr. McNaught's report on August 7, 1985. As a result, Judge Sumsion 
specifically found that the evidence in the record did not warrant a 
finding of permanent total disability prior to the July 25, 1985 
date of permanent total disability previously awarded by his Order 
of November 18, 1985. 
On June 2, 1987 plaintiff filed a Motion for Review with 
the Industial Commission. The full Commission on July 6, 1987 
issued Order Denying Motion for Review in which it was pointed out 
that plaintiff's Motion for Review was nearly four months in filing 
and no extension of time to file a Motion was ever allowed by the 
Administrative Law Judge or the Commission. Nevertheless, the 
Commission reviewed the history of plaintiff's injury and the 
various Orders issued in connection therewith and held that the 
Commission "finds the Administrative Law Judge correctly decided the 
date benefits were to begin based on the preponderance of the 
competent medical evidence" and held that plaintiff's Motion for 
retroactive benefits beginning in October, 1981 should be denied. 
Plaintiff on August 5, 1987 filed this action in the Court of 
Appeals as Case No. 870336-CA asserting that the Industrial 
Commission in its Order denying Motion for Review acted without or 
in excess of its authority. 
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V. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Many of the salient facts in this controversy are set forth 
above in the Statement of the Case. However, the following 
chronological listing of pertinent facts and events is set forth to 
provide a complete picture of plaintiff's injury, his treatment, 
surgically and otherwise, and the development of his auxiliary 
problems which provided the bases for the final determination by the 
Commission that the first clear cut showing of permanent total 
disability on the part of the plaintiff did not appear until the 
July 25, 1985 date ultimately selected by the Commission as the date 
for plaintiff's permanent total disability to commence. 
1. Plaintiff on October 6, 1975 sustained an industrial 
injury when he slipped on muddy surface and fell backward 
up on his back shoulder and neck. The injury was promptly 
reported and the employer assumed Workers• Compensation 
liability for plaintiff's compensation and medical 
expenses. (R3, 5) 
2. Because of the apparent nature of the injury which was 
diagnosed initially as a "severe cervical strain" (R3) 
plaintiff 's initial treatment consisted of medication and 
therapy only. Indeed the initial physicians report of 
injury indicated that no permanent injury was expected. 
3. When conservative treatment failed to show positive 
improvement plaintiff was referred to a neurological 
surgeon who continued the conservative treatment and 
physical therapy, including the use of a soft cervical 
collar, with the expectation that plaintiff would soon be 
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improved sufficiently to perform some physical labor. 
4. By July 1976 plaintiff's treating specialists had noted 
no improvement in his symptoms but nevertheless recommended 
continuance of sedentary activity and a course of active 
exercise under a physical therapist. (R14) Dr. Gaufin 
also recommended an EMG study to determine whether or not 
there was major nerve root involvement. 
5. Following a cervical myelogram on November 8, 1976 
plaintiff was admitted to the Utah hospital on November 16, 
1976 where an anterior discectomy and nerve root 
decompression and fusion were performed (R34) with the 
apparent expectation that plaintiff would soon be ready for 
return to employment. 
6. Following plaintiff's operation additional therapy 
combined with sedentary activities failed to result in any 
substantial improvement and a second operation was 
performed on August 18f 1977 where plaintiff had a left 
first rib resection in order to improve the symptoms in his 
left arm. (R46) 
7. By March 19. 1978 plaintiff's treating physician Dr. 
Gaufin reported that the "patient's condition has 
stabilized as far as I can assess from a neurological 
standpoint." He further rated plaintiff as having a 20% 
full body impairment and loss of "physical function 
secondary to persistent muscle pain referred to the 
shoulder, arm, and cervical area" (R54). 
8. Plaintiff through his attorney requested a hearing in 
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May 19, 1978 and was provided with an Application for 
Hearing form which was finally completed and filed with the 
Industrial Commission on July 3, 1978. In his application 
plaintiff claimed permanent total disability as a result of 
his October 6. 1975 industrial injury. (R74) In the 
meantime, the defendant employer requested an independent 
medical examination which was accomplished on June 23, 1978 
by neurologist Chester B. Powell. Dr. Powell in his report 
(R65) noted that plaintiff's failure to be significantly 
improved following his surgical procedures was "a most 
unusual course for simple cervical disc disease" (R68). 
Dr. Powell then raised a number of questions and followed 
with strong recommendation for a thorough re-evaluation of 
plaintiff which he reported should include: 
a. EMG and myelography; 
b. Current medical evaluation; 
c. Current consultation depending upon results of the 
above, which might include neurologic, orthopedic, and 
psychiatric opinions. 
d. Depending upon findings, the patient might be a 
candidate for further specific treatment. (R69) 
Dr. Powell also acknowledged that at the time of his 
examination plaintiff was totally disabled and probably 
would remain so unless through the above recommendations 
some medical bases for improving his disability could be 
determined. (R69) Dr. Powell's final opinion: ". . .at 
present I would not consider him to have reached a point of 
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maximal improvement." (R70) 
9. On August 30, 1978 Administrative Law Judge, Keith E. 
Sohm, (who since June 1985 has served as plaintiff's 
attorney in the controversy now before the Court of 
Appeals) appointed a Medical Panel to examine plaintiff and 
evaluate the medical aspects of his claim for compensation 
benefits. (R80) Following some difficulty in obtaining 
the Medical Panel examination, the Panel on March 5. 1979 
examined plaintiff and reviewed his industrial injury. The 
Panel Report (R103) was received by the Industrial 
Commission on March 19, 1979. The Medical Panel found 
plaintiff to have 67% permanent partial impairment with 60% 
being attributable to* the October 6, 1975 industrial 
injury. The Panel also found that plaintiff had been 
totally disabled since his injury but expressed-as did Dr. 
Powell-the need for additional testing before making 
definite recommendations. The Panel also stated that any 
recommendations with respect to further surgery would 
depend on the findings of the recommended studies. (R105) 
10. Following receipt of the Medical Panel report 
plaintiff's then counsel renewed his request for a 
permanent total disability Order, however. Administrative 
Law Judge Sohm was reluctant to award permanent total 
disability benefits until such time as the recommended 
studies and testing and possible surgery had been 
completed. Therefore, he awarded plaintiff permanent 
partial disability benefits based on 60% (as found by the 
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Panel) of 312 weeks or 187.2 weeks of compensation 
beginning on the March 1# 1978 stabilization date found by 
the Panel and deferring a decision as to permanent total 
disability until the expiration of the permanent partial 
disability period on approximately October 2f 1981. (R124) 
11. On May 16, 1979 plaintiff filed Motion for Review and 
Points of Authority with the Industrial Commission (R129) 
in which he asserted error on the part of Judge Sohm in not 
awarding 100% disability. 
12. On July 18f 1979 the Industrial Commission issued 
"Denial of Motion for Review" (R140) in which the 
Commission affirmed the Order of the Administrative Law 
Judge, referring to the recommended additional tests and 
studies and the possibility of additional surgery as a 
bases of deferring a final determination with respect to 
permanent and total disability. In its denial of 
plaintiff's motion, the Commission elected to "defer 
further consideration of this case to at least March 1, 
1981.". . . and then held that after that date "the 
applicant may again file with the Commission for a 
determination of permanent partial or permanent total 
disability benefits." (underscoring supplied) (R141) 
13. On August 18, 1979 plaintiff moved for the review by 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah of the Industrial 
Commission ruling. (146) On October 29, 1979 the Utah 
Supreme Court issued Remittitur in which it ordered that 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Petition for Writ 
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of Review be granted "on the ground that the adjudication 
under attack does not appear to be a final Order." (Rl 
unnumbered page at the beginning of the volume) 
14. Following the Supreme Court dismissal referred to 
above Judge Sohm on January 17, 1980 advised plaintiff's 
then counsel that the case was "laid to rest" at least 
until the March 1, 1981 date set by the Industrial 
Commission in its Order Denying Motion for Review and that 
no new hearings would be entertained unless plaintiff could 
show a substantial deterioration in his condition since the 
last Order was entered in which case he could then file a 
new application for hearing. 
15. The Commission's file indicates that no further action 
was taken with regard to plaintiff's claim for permanent 
total disability until March 25, 1985 when the Commission 
received a letter from plaintiff (R2,34) requesting 
additional compensation benefits. In that letter plaintiff 
stated that he had worked only six months since his last 
receipt of workers' compensation and that his "condition 
has gotten progressively and more severe especially in the 
winter". On April 1, 1985 Judge Sohm responded to 
plaintiff with respect to the payment of medical bills and 
with respect to the procedure to be followed should he 
claim additional compensation benefits. (R2,35) 
16. Approximately three months later, on June 28, 1985, 
the Commission received a letter from the same Keith Sohm 
who had been the Administrative Law Judge on all prior 
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proceedings involving the plaintiff. This time Mr. Sohm 
was representing plaintiff, having retired sometime in May, 
1985, and the letter requested a change of doctors for the 
plaintiff. (R2,38) This was followed a few days later by 
a formal Application for Hearing signed by plaintiff and 
submitted by Mr. Sohm as his attorney in which plaintiff 
claimed rights to additional medical benefits as well as 
permanent total disability compensation. (R2,42) Attached 
to the Application for Hearing was plaintiff's affidavit in 
which he alleged that his condition has continued to worsen 
and that his only employment was for a short time as a back 
up man to his wife who was hired as resident manager of 
Four Seasons for a short time. He further indicated that 
when his wife was terminated his employment also 
terminated. (R2,45) 
17. On August 7, 1985 the Commission received a medical 
report from plaintiff's latest treating physician Dr. Ross 
McNaught who had examined the applicant on July 25, 1985. 
Dr. McNaught's report (R2,180) referred to plaintiff's 
continued symptoms in the neck and upper extremities but 
mentioned recent symptoms in the lower extremities as well 
and referred also to deterioration of plaintiff's 
complaints over the last two months including episodes of 
dizziness, headaches etc. In addition Dr. McNaught 
stated: "It is my opinion, however, that his neurologic 
picture is deteriorating particularly over the last couple 
of months, and I feel that if something is not done, very 
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likely more complete paralysis may result. . .". (R2, 
181) Dr. McNaught also suggested extensive neurological 
work up studies, including hospitalization, with the 
possibility of further surgery in both the neck and low 
back areas. 
18. The receipt of Dr. McNaught»s letter and the 
additional recommendations made therein prompted exchanges 
of communications and a meeting involving the 
Administrative Law Judge newly appointed on this case, 
Richard G. Sumsion, the Administrator of the Second Injury 
Fund and counsel for the employer along with Mr. Sohm. 
That meeting resulted in a waiver by the employer and the 
Second Injury Fund of the statutory requirement that any 
permanent total disability finding required initial 
submission to the Utah Rehabilitation Division. All 
parties acknowledged the permanent total disability status 
of plaintiff and agreed to his immediate placement on the 
permanent total disability payroll, with matters to be 
determined through a subsequent supplemental Medical Panel 
referral including the appropriate date of permanent total 
disability, accrued amounts due, including interest, and 
the medical expenses properly payable by the employer 
and/or allocation of the same between the employer and the 
Second Injury Fund. The net result was the issuance on 
November 18, 1985 by Judge Sumsion of Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order summarizing and referring in 
particular to Dr. McNaught's letter of July 25, 1985 in 
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which there was evidence for the first time of a 
deterioration in plaintiff's condition. The Order further 
placed plaintiff on the permanent total disability payroll 
as of the July 25, 1985 examination and report made by Dr. 
McNaught. (R2, 63) 
19. On November 26, 1985 plaintiff filed Motion for Review 
of the November 18, 1985 Order of Judge Sumsion, contending 
that plaintiff was entitled to permanent total disability 
effective 1981 and also requesting payment of all medical 
bills, past, present and future. (R2,72) 
20. Following a pre-hearing conference held by Judge 
Sumsion on February 20, 1986 all parties, including 
plaintiff, the employer/carrier and the Second Injury Fund, 
agreed to have plaintiff referred to a supplemental Medical 
Panel examination and report to determine plaintiff's 
permanent impairment as of the date of examination as 
compared to that found by the Medical Panel in the 1979 
Panel report, whether or not there had been any changes in 
plaintiff's condition since October, 1981 and if so what 
and when such changes occurred. In addition, the Panel was 
to render its opinion as to whether or not plaintiff was 
essentially unemployable from a physical standpoint and if 
so, when that condition of unemployability occurred in the 
opinion of the Panel. On March 3, 1986 Judge Sumsion, by 
letter referred plaintiff to Dr. Nathaniel M. Nord for 
complete examination and evaluation and for response to the 
questions above listed. (R2, 107) 
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21. On April 15, 1986 the full Industrial Commission 
issued Partial Granting of Motion for Review so that the 
Second Injury Fund could initiate payment of permanent and 
total compensation benefits beginning at least as early as 
July 25, 1985 as found previously by the Administrative Law 
Judge. The Commission deferred the other critical items 
such as final determination of the appropriate date for 
permanent total liability and other issues pertaining to 
interest and attorney's fees until the completion of the 
Medical Panel evaluation. (R2, 121) 
22. On November 7, 1986 Nathaniel M. Nord, MD, issued his 
Supplemental Medical Panel evaluation report following a 
thorough examination of plaintiff on September 26, 1986 and 
a review of the medical records including the 1979 Medical 
Panel report. (R2,127) In his Supplemental report Dr. 
Nord reviewed plaintiff's symptoms as reported by the 
original Medical Panel and as compared to those encountered 
by him in his September examination of plaintiff. 
Significantly Dr. Nord reported that "an objective 
evaluation of physical impairment is quite impossible based 
upon the present examination circumstances. . .", referring 
also to what he termined "a totally factitious give and go 
weakness when all muscle groups of all extremities were 
tested." In addition Dr. Nord stated that he was unable to 
comprehend on what basis the 1979 Medical Panel members 
assigned a 60% permanent partial impairment rating as a 
consequence of the industrial injury of October 6, 1975 and 
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even the 7% recommended finger amputation impairment which 
according to Dr. Nordfs evaluation using the appropriate 
standards should have been rated at 5%. With respect to 
the degree of permanent partial impairment attributable to 
the industrial injury Dr. Nord stated that it would be much 
less than 60% and more likely in the range of 20-30%." 
(R2f130) Dr. Nord in terms of reasonable probability 
reported that there was no significant change in 
plaintiff's permanent physical impairment, that symptoms of 
dysfunction are reported to be increased while "objective 
changes in physical examination cannot be appreciated." In 
response to Judge Sumsion's question with respect to the 
employability of plaintiff Dr. Nord reported: 
The applicant was not rendered unemployable as of 
October 1, 1981 or subsequent thereto on the basis of 
physical impairment. However, intensified symptoms, 
the patients perceptions of disability and attitudes 
regarding return to work likely rendered him 
unemployable. 
23. Following his review of Dr. Nord's supplemental Panel 
report Judge Sumsion on February 2, 1987 issued "Amended 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order" in which he 
compared the medical evaluation experience under the Utah 
Worker's Compensation Act of the 1979 Medical Panel in this 
case and that of Dr. Nord who "had extensive experience in 
serving on Industrial Commission Medical Panels and is 
highly respected for his competency and impartiality in 
rendering advisory opinions to the Industrial Commission." 
In any event. Judge Sumsion adopted the Panel report of 
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Dr. Nord in preference to the 1979 report on plaintiff and 
found plaintiff's permanent impairment to be 30% due to the 
industrial injury (rather than the 60% found in the 1979 
report) and 5% impairment resulting from plaintiff's finger 
amputation. In addition. Judge Sumsion also adopted the 
findings of Dr. Nord that there was not significant change 
in plaintiff's permanent physical impairment even though 
symptoms of dysfunction were reported to be increased and 
further that applicant was not rendered unemployable as of 
October 1, 1981 or subsequent thereto on the basis of 
physical impairment. This was followed by his critical 
adoption of Dr. Nord's opinion that the "intensified 
symptoms, the patient's perceptions of disability and 
attitudes regarding return to work likely rendered him 
unemployable." (R2, 141) However, Judge Sumsion found, as 
he previously had indicated, that he had no intention of 
modifying the previous finding of plaintiff's permanent 
total disability commencing as of July 25, 1985 following 
the receipt of Dr. McNaught's report, mentioning the 
intensified symptoms referred to also by Dr. Nord in his 
Supplemental Panel report. 
24. On June 2, 1987 the Commission received plaintiff's 
Motion for Review filed in his behalf by attorney Sohra (R2, 
151) which was answered by Order Denying Motion for Review 
issued July 6, 1987 and signed by all three members of the 
Utah Industrial Commission (R2, 187) 
-19-
VI, SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is defendant's position that m e soie issue ror 
determination before the Court is whether or not the Commission's 
designation of July 25, 1985 as the appropriate date for the 
commencement of plaintiff's permanent total disability benefits 
against defendant was wholly unsupported by substantial evidence in 
the record and thus an abuse of the Commission's discretion under 
the Utah Worker's Compensation Act to establish the amount and time 
compensation may be awarded. As this Court stated in its decision 
in Charles Oman v. Industrial Commission. 55 Utah Adv. Rep. 59 (Ct 
App 4/15/87): 
There is no statutory language requiring benefits to 
commence at either the date of injury of the last day of 
employment, which ever occurs earlier. 
And further: 
Thus this Court must determine if the Commission's 
Order was supported by substantial evidence and was a 
reasonable exercise of the Commission's discretion. Norton 
v. Industrial Commission. 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986); 
Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet Management, 725 P.2d 1323 
(Utah 1986); Kaiser Steel Corp v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 
(Utah 1981). 
In that case, the Court referred to the progressive 
worsening of plaintiff's psychiatric problems and stated: 
The Industrial Commission did not act unreasonably nor 
abuse its discretion by selecting the September 24, 1984, 
date for commencement of benefits given the progressive 
nature of plaintiff's disability and the difficultly of 
determining the exact date of maturation of the 
disability. Booms v. Rapp 720 P. 2d 1636 (Utah 1986). 
Finally this Court, cited with concurrence Spencer v. 
Industrial Commission, 87 Utah 336, 40 P. 2d 188 (1935): 
Whether an employee is totally disabled or permanently 
disabled are ultimate matters to be decided by the 
Commissioner, as is also the amount and time compensation 
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may be awarded upon all evidence. 
The Court concluded with the rationale which is applicable 
in its entirety to this case: 
It is within the sound discretion of the Industrial 
Commission to determine the commencement date of benefits 
for total disability so long as the determination is 
supported by substantial evidence and not patently 
unreasonable. Substantial evidence existed in this case 
for commencing benefits as of the first date of medical 
confirmation of permanent total disability. 
It is defendant's position that the principles of law and 
the rationale set forth above in the Oman case and the cases 
referred to therein are directly applicable to the Commission's 
determination of plaintiff's appropriate permanent total disability 
date in this controversy and that the supporting evidence in the 
record include plaintiff's own affidavit of March 1985, 
Dr.McNaught's report of his July 25, 1985 examination of plaintiff 
with reference to recent worsening of his condition and recent 
neurological changes, and in particular Dr. Nord's detailed report 
referring to plaintiff's "intensified dysfunction symptoms, the 
patient's perception of disability and attitudes regarding return to 
work". Such evidence constituted the principle factors 
preponderating in the Commission's selection of the July 25, 1985 
commencement date for plaintiff's permanent total disability 
benefits against defendant. It is defendant's position that they 
constitute also "substantial evidence" in support of the Commissions 
determination-evidence which is clearly sufficient to show that the 
Commission did not abuse its discretion in this case. 
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VII. ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD 
TO SUPPORT THE DETERMINATION MADE BY THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION, IN ITS DISCRETION, OF THE COMMENCEMENT 
DATE FOR PLAINTIFF'S PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY 
BENEFITS. 
As stated above, it is defendant's position that this case 
is governed by the rationale and the principles of law set forth by 
this Court in the Charles G. Oman decision Supra in which it was 
held that "it is within the sound discretion of the Industrial 
Commission to determine the commencement date of benefits for total 
permanent disability so long as the determination is supported by 
substantial evidence and not patently unreasonable. In that case, 
as in this controversy, plaintiff received an industrial back injury 
which required multiple surgery for which he was awarded permanent 
partial disability benefits. In that case, there was medical 
evidence which showed that plaintiff's psychiatric problems became 
progressively worse, finally culminating in permanent total 
disability. The Commission reviewed all of the medical evidence and 
the report of the Rehabilitation Division before selecting the date 
for commencement of permanent total disability benefits. This Court 
upheld that determination with the following: 
The Industrial Commission did not act unreasonably nor 
abuse its discretion by selecting the September 24, 1984, 
date for commencement of benefits, given the progressive 
nature of plaintiff's disability and the difficultly of 
determining the exact date of maturation of the disability. 
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In this case, the Commission, as well as the ALJ. reviewed 
the entire history of plaintiff's injury and medical treatment, 
including the 1979 report of the first medical panel. The 
Commission reviewed also the July 25. 1985 letter report of Dr. 
McNaught and the supplemental panel report issued by Dr. Nord in 
November. 1986. The Commission found, as it did in 1979. that the 
suggestions and recommendations set forth in the panel report as 
well as in the report of Dr. Powell rendered those reports clearly 
inconclusive as to the finding of permanent total disability alleged 
by plaintiff. The Commission then referred to the July 25. 1985 
letter report of Dr. McNaught as being the first clear cut 
indication that plaintiff's condition had deteriorated to an extent 
sufficient to justify a permanent total disability classification. 
Dr. McNaught's remarks that "it is my opinion that his neurologic 
picture is deteriorating, particularly over the last couple of 
months . . ." were noted by the ALJ in his designation of the 
July 25. 1985 commencement date for plaintiff's permanent total 
disability benefits. Those remarks also played a part in the 
referral by the ALJ-with the concurrence of the parties-for a 
determination as to what date if any between 1981 and July 25. 1985 
was the appropriate date for designation of plaintiff's permanent 
total disability. 
The Commission, as well as the ALJ, relied heavily upon the 
supplemental panel report of Dr. Nord in their determination that 
the July 25. 1985 date selected by ALJ following receipt of Dr. 
McNaught's report was the earliest appropriate date for commencement 
of plaintiff's permanent total disability benefits. The Commission 
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noted initially Dr. Nord's permanent partial and impairment rating 
of plaintiff as in the range of 20 to 30 percent rather than the 60 
percent impairment found by the 1979 panel. While such a wide 
difference could indicate some improvement in plaintiff's condition 
it appeared in Dr. Nord's opinion to represent an exaggerated 
evaluation of plaintiff's actual impairment by the 1979 Panel. 
Secondly, Dr. Nord reported that objective changes in physical 
examination could not be appreciated even though "Symptoms of 
dysfunction are reported to be increased". Finally, it was Dr. 
Nord's express opinion that plaintiff " . . . . was not rendered 
unemployable as of October 1, 1981 or, subsequent thereto, on the 
basis of physical impairment. However, intensified symptoms, the 
patient's perceptions of disability and attitudes regarding return 
to work likely render him unemployable." The Commission interpreted 
those findings as being significant contributing factors in support 
of the July 25, 1985 date selected previously by the ALJ as the 
earliest appropriate date for commencement of plaintiff's permanent 
total disability. It is clear that Dr. Nord regarded plaintiff's 
increased symptoms of dysfunction as well as his perceptions of 
disability and attitudes regarding return to work as being 
subjective, psychological, or even psychiatric in nature and that 
they were relatively recent in origin rather than dating back to 
1979 or even 1981. It is clear also that the Commission placed 
primary emphasis upon those factors as being responsible for the 
worsening or deterioration of plaintiff's condition which resulted 
in the selection of July 25, 1985 as the appropriate date of 
permanent total disability for commencement of plaintiff's benefits. 
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In addition to the medical reports and opinions referred to 
above, plaintiff himself referred to his condition as having 
worsened in the period from 1981 to March 20, 1985 in a letter 
addressed by him to the Commission. (R2, 35) in which he mentioned 
also that he had worked for six months. This was explained in a 
subsequent affidavit attached to plaintiff's Application for Hearing 
(R2, 46) in which plaintiff's wife stated that plaintiff had served 
as a backup to her during a period of time and that when she was let 
go plaintiff was laid off too. If nothing else it does indicate 
that there was employment of some kind which plaintiff could and did 
perform at least during a portion of the interim period. 
In summary there is substantial evidence in the record to 
support the Industrial Commission findings: 
First, that the original medical panel evaluation of 
plaintiff made in March 1979 was inconclusive and therefore 
insufficient to support a finding at that time of permanent total 
disability as to the plaintiff, Sharon Heaton. This is particularly 
true in the light of the subsequent examination some seven years 
later which raised serious questions as to the correctness of the 60 
percent permanent partial impairment evaluation made by the 1979 
medical panel for compensation purposes at that time; 
Second, that the July 25, 1985 letter of Dr. McNaught 
together with the later November 7, 1986 Supplemental Panel Report 
by Dr. Nord provided a basis for the determination by the Commission 
as well as the Administrative Law Judge for the selection of the 
July 25, 1985 date as the commencement of plaintiff's permanent 
total disability compensation benefits. Those reports show 
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continued deterioration of plaintiff's condition and particularly, 
in the opinion of Dr. Nord, intensified subjective symptoms 
including those relating to plaintiff's perceptions of disability 
and attitudes regarding his return to work which in the opinion of 
Dr. Nord were sufficient to render him unemployable as of the date 
of his examination. 
Third, that the Commission did not abuses discretion or act 
unreasonably in adopting Dr. Nord's opinion that plaintiff was not 
rendered unemployable as of October 1, 1981, or subsequent thereto, 
on basis of physical impairment. 
Fourth, that the Commission likewise did not abuses 
discretion in regarding, as did Dr. Nord, plaintiff's intensified 
symptoms and others subjective complains, as well as his perceptions 
of disability and attitudes regarding return to work as being all of 
relatively recent origin and as being the significant factors which 
clearly identified plaintiff as permanently and totally disabled. 
Fifth, that given the progressive nature of plaintiff's 
recent neurological deterioration as reported by Dr. McNaught and 
his intensified dysfunction symptoms and perceptions of disability 
and attitudes regarding return to work as reported by Dr. Nord and 
given the recognize the difficulty of determining the exact date of 
maturation of plaintiff's permanent total disability stated, the 
Industrial Commission did not abuse its discretion or act 
unreasonably in selecting the July 25, 1985 date of Dr. McNaught * s 
report as the appropriate date for commencement of plaintiff's 
permanent total disability compensation benefits. As stated by the 
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Utah Supreme Court in the 1935 decision of Spencer v. Industrial 
Commission, Supra: 
Whether an employee is totally disabled or permanently 
disabled or ultimate matters to be decided by the 
Commissioner, as is also the amount and time compensation 
may be awarded upon all the evidence. 
In this case, the Commission, upon its evaluation of all 
the evidence including the benefit of the most recent supplemental 
panel report, made its determination that plaintiff's permanent 
total disability stated for compensation benefits under the Utah 
Worker's Compensation Act was not established with the any requisite 
degree of certaintly until July 25, 1985 the date of the examination 
and report made by Dr. Ross McNaught. The designation by the 
Commission of that date is supported by substantial evidence in the 
record. Therefore, under well established Utah Worker's 
Compensation Law as recently set forth in the Oman decision of this 
Court and the cases therein cited, the Commission's exercise of its 
discretionary responsibility to determine the commencement date of 
benefits for plaintiff's total permanent disability properly should 
be affirmed. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Industrial Commission had the responsibility, within 
its discretion, to determine the commencement date for plaintiff's 
permanent total disability benefits. It made that selection based 
upon its evaluation of the entire case history, including in 
particular the medical reports. There is substantial evidence in 
the record in support of the Commission's determination. The 
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Commission did not abuse its discretion in its selection date for 
the commencement of plaintiff's benefits. Therefore, the decision 
of the Commission should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of December 1987. 
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